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ABSTRACT
This article offers an original, intellectual portrait of G. H. Mead. My
reassessment of Mead’s thinking is founded, in methodological terms,
upon a historically minded yet theoretically oriented strategy. Mead’s
system of thought is submitted to a historical reconstruction in order
to grasp the evolution of his ideas over time, and to a thematic recon-
struction organized around three major research areas or pillars: science,
social psychology and politics. If one re-examines the entirety of Mead’s
published and unpublished writings from the point of view of contem-
porary social and political theory, one can see that his contributions
transcend the field of social psychology. Mead’s innovative insights on
the communicative aspects of social life and individual conscience are
yet to be fully explored by current social and political theorists. This is
partly due to the fact that his was a system in a state of flux, ever
escaping the final written form.
Key words democratic politics, experimental science, G. H. Mead,
social psychology, sociological classics
INTRODUCTION
This article aims at showing that George Herbert Mead’s social and political
thought can be reconstructed as a building which evolved during the course
of his career. To use an architectonic metaphor, it will be suggested that
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Mead’s intellectual edifice is built upon three pillars. The first is the pillar of
science that establishes the criterion for an internally democratic community
of communication, a community that can be said to reflect the social impli-
cations of the ‘method of intelligence’, i.e. the scientific experimental method.
The logical priority of the pillar of science within Mead’s system of thought
refers to the fact that the principles of the modern scientific method are
applied in the resolution of specific problems in social psychology and demo-
cratic politics. The second is the pillar of social psychology that derives from
the former pillar, given the scientific character that Mead claims for this disci-
pline, and whose object is the social process of the formation of the human
self. Finally, a theory of participative democracy and social reform, whose
ethical implications must be submitted to scientific treatment, is the last pillar
of an ‘ambitiously projected but unfinished building’, as Horace Thayer once
put it (1968: 235).
It is my contention that the most important aspects of Mead’s work are
captured by these three topics. Of course, given the systematic nature of
Mead’s thought, some items do fall under the scope of more than one pillar,
but nothing is excluded from at least one of them. What seems to result from
this is a fundamental unity linking otherwise disparate writings, both in terms
of the internal coherence of each pillar, and in terms of the systemic coher-
ence of the whole. This unity, I argue, stems from the fact that the pillar of
science takes logical precedence over the other pillars: it is from the perspec-
tive of a scientist that Mead analyses the social character of subjectivity and
the ‘social and moral order’. Furthermore, this theoretical system will be
presented as a systematic effort to understand the societal shift towards
modernity. Mead, contrary to what is widely assumed, not only developed
an analysis of ‘modern times’ from the perspective of a social scientist
concerned with the developmental logic of human consciousness, but studied
the economic, political, social and moral consequences of the processes of
industrialization, urban growth and expansion of the functions of the state
as well. A central purpose of this article, then, is to bring out the systematic
order of these fundamental elements of Mead’s intellectual edifice. If there is
coherence to his thought, I believe it will be reflected in the internal coher-
ence of these three pillars as well as in their interconnectedness.
Three different analytical levels can be distinguished as far as my interpret-
ation of Mead’s thinking is concerned. At the metatheoretical level, I contend
that history of theory and theory construction should be seen as different
parts of the same endeavour. Pace Merton (1967), this article aims at showing
that historicism can and should be reconciled with presentism. From a theor-
etical perspective, I suggest that the history of the reception of Mead’s ideas
in sociology can be best described as a narrative where ‘Mead, the social
psychologist’ is the leading character, whereas the ‘scientist’ and the ‘politi-
cal thinker and activist’ are hardly mentioned at all. This article is thus aimed
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at showing that such a narrative, however ingrained in the discipline’s self-
understanding, does not correspond to the truth. Finally, regarding my
methodological strategy, I argue that historical or genetic reconstruction
must be intertwined with a reconstruction based on topics or themes if one
wishes to understand both the full scope and process of development of the
object of study in question. In fact, a substantial part of the innovative char-
acter of my study of Mead lies in this particular methodological strategy. Of
course, other Mead scholars have mobilized somewhat similar strategies. I
am thinking of David L. Miller’s path-breaking study (1973), Hans Joas’s
G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought (1997[1985]),
and the more recent books by Gary Alan Cook and Andrew Feffer (see
Cook, 1993; Feffer, 1993). Nonetheless, as this article will show, the way I
propose to reconcile a genetic reconstruction of Mead’s ideas with a thematic
one is distinctively different from any of them.1
THE FIRST PILLAR: EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE
AND THE ACT
My main aim in what follows is to analyse Mead’s conception of science from
the point of view of its evolution over time, beginning with the unpublished
student notes from Mead’s 1911 course on the ‘Logic of the Social Sciences’,
and moving on to the period between the publication, in 1917, of ‘Scientific
Method and Individual Thinker’ and Mead’s last written work, the 1930
Carus Lectures published posthumously in The Philosophy of the Present
(2002[1932]). The main topic of discussion will be Mead’s theory of the act, a
model of action with significant social-psychological and ethical implications.
Mead’s conception of science is but a part of a more general social-
theoretical endeavour. In 1917, Mead ascertains this idea by arguing that the
completion of the pragmatist programme of scientific activity is dependent
on a sound explanation of the origin of human consciousness that dissolves
the dichotomy between the psychical and the physical (see Mead, 1917: 206).
Indeed, during the following decade, under the influence of the British
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, Mead writes a series of articles whose
main purpose is to analyse the reconstructive process associated with the
growth of scientific knowledge. Parenthetically, it must be noted that Mead’s
analysis of such a reconstructive process is a variation on a theme that had
already caught his attention in the mid-1890s, when he accepted Dewey’s
invitation to join the Department of Philosophy at the University of
Chicago. His later writings on the philosophy of science, around which my
discussion in this section will revolve, are, from this point of view, the last
and more articulated version of Mead’s efforts to analyse the connection
between human reflexivity and the reconstruction of experiential problems.
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An early version of Mead’s treatment of this relationship is found in the
aforementioned unpublished set of student notes dating from 1911. In this
course, Mead presents a tri-dimensional analysis of the logic of the social
sciences. He starts with their epistemological status, proceeds with a discussion
of the social nature of rationality and concludes with an analysis of the ethical
and political implications of his proposal. If there is one central motif in Mead’s
course, it is the idea of dialogue, a notion that is omnipresent throughout his
analysis of human thought and consciousness. It is in linguistic communi-
cation that one can find the explanatory element needed for understanding
the origin, process of development and full implications of rationality or, in
Mead’s pragmatist vocabulary, ‘intelligence’. This is an explanation whose
examples include, symptomatically, children’s dialogues with their parents or
the scientist’s way of reasoning. The problem-solving nature of rational
thought is seen as the socio-biological framework within which modern
science must be understood.
This is summed up in a rather crucial passage from those student notes:
‘This primitive attitude the logician calls the universe of discourse – it is rather
the universe of intercourse. . . . In the forum of thought the individual himself
appears as the person who presents the problem, then others appear as critics’
(Mead, 1911). By calling ‘universe of intercourse’ what the logician calls the
‘universe of discourse’, Mead is trying to convey the idea that communication
is the mechanism upon which human reasoning is founded. In particular, the
problematizing attitude characteristic of modern experimental science is to
be conceived as a logical extension of the emergence of the rational self.
For Mead, experimental science always operates with a mind that is social,
for inferential thought includes the common reference of symbols in dialogue
and thinking. That is, scientific rationality involves communication with
ourselves and other individuals. What Mead is adducing here is the notion of
‘sociality of science’, a characteristic feature of Mead’s conception of science
in the 1920s. As Miller has already pointed out, the systematic nature of Mead’s
thinking comes to the fore when one considers the multiple applications of
the principle of sociality (see Miller, 1973: 188–206). What I wish to discuss
here is Mead’s attempt to use his social-psychological view of human intel-
ligence to explore the reconstructive process involved in scientific knowledge,
i.e. the way both processes of thinking and science are explained in terms of
the principle of sociality. This principle, contrary to what is suggested by
Miller, should not be seen as the interpretative key to Mead’s oeuvre. There
is at least one good reason for this. It would be an unacceptable anachronism
to read Mead’s early work in the light of a conceptual category he developed
in his later writings. The evolution of Mead’s thinking cannot, therefore, be
understood by reference to the principle of sociality. This principle, however,
is very useful to clarify how certain aspects of his intellectual edifice are
systematically connected.
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Briefly, Mead’s attempt to connect his social conception of the self and his
experimentalist conception of science is better understood by reference to the
notion of sociality. The principle of sociality refers to a process of adjustment
located in the present. As the process of adjustment unfolds, novel events
(say, unexplained scientific data) are ‘betwixt and between the old system and
the new’ (Mead, 2002[1932]: 47): during this period, they are unintelligible.
Only when the adjustment is concluded do those events have a past and
belong to a new system. In the case of the example suggested above, the adjust-
ment occurs when a new scientific theory is able to explain the data: earlier
exceptions can now be explained, along with all the data already explained
by older theories. In this sense, Mead claims, the relation between the old
and the new ‘is a process of logical reconstruction by which out of excep-
tions the new law arises to replace a structure that has become inadequate’.
Mead further notes that ‘In both of these processes . . . the individual func-
tions in his full particularity, and yet in organic relationship with the society
which is responsible for him’ (Mead, 1917: 226–7). The old and the new world
are thus social worlds: not only are the reflective thinking and the scientific
method social undertakings, but ‘the individual in whose experience both the
problem and its solution must arise presupposes the community out of which
he springs’ (Mead, 1938: 60).
One can see here Mead connecting, in the most original way, his social
conception of mind and thinking to his conception of experimental science.
For Mead, mind is the ultimate example of the application of the principle of
sociality. In a characteristically pragmatist fashion, Mead equates human
intelligence with the resolution of action problems. When one’s action is
inhibited or there are conflicting tendencies to act, a problem arises. Its reso-
lution demands a creative reconstruction of the situation: several lines of
action must be considered by the individual in his mind before he decides
which one seems the most adequate to solve the problem at hand. The process
of adjustment, which the principle of sociality is supposed to explain, acquires
in this case a particular form. The individual, as she reflects on the various
possibilities of action, finds herself between two worlds: the old world (that
she incorporates through the ‘me’ and the ‘generalized other’) and the new
one, which emerges by means of the impulsive and unpredictable ‘I’. Mead,
in a clearly innovative way, thus suggests a link between reflective thinking
and scientific knowledge. One sheds new light on the process nature of
Mead’s conception of the social self once one realizes that the established
social order represented by the ‘me’ and the new order inaugurated by the
‘I’ affect each other in the most profound sense. The old world does not
simply give way to the new world, in a continuous, linear fashion. Rather,
Mead insists, the principle of sociality shows that the new ‘me’ must adjust
to the old ‘me’, as the old has to adjust to the new. Similarly, the data
explained by Newtonian physics must adjust to (i.e. must be explained by)
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Einstein’s theories, even though the latter is of a more inclusive nature than
the former (hence, scientific progress). For Mead, then, thinking is nothing
short of ‘the highest expression of sociality, because the organism only so
passes from one attitude to another, by means of a phase which is a part of
all these attitudes, but also comes back on itself in the process and responds
to this phase’ (Mead, 2002[1932]: 86).
This statement is a fine example of Mead’s conception of science in the
1920s. In this period, however, Mead’s intellectual production on politics and
morals suffered a slight decrease. In turn, his writings on a four-phased
theory of action, on the theory of perception of the physical object that stems
from it, and on his theory of time became more frequent and eventually came
to assume a central position in his later thought. To begin with, Mead’s
dismissal of absolute idealism (see, for example, 2002[1932]: 171) is connected
with the endorsement of the relativistic theories of Bergson and Whitehead.2
The existence of one single absolute perspective precludes the objectivity of
individual perspectives, as well as evolution, novelty and creativity. On the
contrary, Mead’s social theory of human consciousness and Whitehead’s rela-
tivistic philosophy share the same emphasis on the ‘objectivity of perspec-
tives’ (1938: 114). What Mead wishes to select from the latter’s proposal is its
‘conception of nature as an organization of perspectives, which are there in
nature’ (2002[1932]: 173). Individual perspectives emerge from a social
perspective which, in turn, transcends the mere collection of individual
perspectives. But how can one secure the objectivity of individual perspec-
tives? In Mead’s view, the answer to this question lies in a pragmatic test. An
individual perspective, understood as an organization of events, is considered
to be objective or real if it leads to the consummation of an act that was previ-
ously inhibited.
At this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that Mead conceives of the act
as comprehending four stages. First, there is an impulse, in the sense of a
physiological predisposition of the organism to respond to a given stimulus;
second, the organism perceives either an object or a segment of the surround-
ing environment;3 third, the organism manipulates the perceived object,
either physically (e.g. an apple) or intellectually (e.g. a past event); fourth, the
organism attributes a certain value to the object in question thereby consum-
mating the act.4 Mead’s theory of the act has been recently re-examined by
Alex Gillespie (2005) in a refreshing and provocative way. Gillespie’s claim is
that the kernel of Mead’s contribution to contemporary debates on the origins
of consciousness is ‘a social interaction that has become an institution, with
established positions . . . which are stable over time’ (2005: 27). This social
interaction is designated as a ‘social act’: ‘The social act, and not the act,
provides a means to escape Cartesian solipsism’, Gillespie argues (2005: 34).
Beyond any doubt, we have here one of the most innovative interpretations
of Mead’s work to appear in the last decade or so. My acknowledgement of
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this fact, however, should not be seen as an unreserved endorsement of Gille-
spie’s thesis.
My chief reservation regarding Gillespie’s interpretation concerns his
inability to adequately appreciate the intersubjective and dialogical nature of
Mead’s conception of the act.5 Gillespie claims that Mead’s central contri-
bution is the social act because Mead’s conception of the act ‘has little room
for the other’ (2005: 34). In my view, to suggest that Mead’s theory of the act
is individualistic (i.e. is based upon a self–object dyadic relation), and that one
has to focus on his notion of ‘social act’ to find a truly intersubjective contri-
bution, amounts to failing to appreciate the actual nature and extent of Mead’s
version of intersubjectivism. This is particularly clear when one considers the
way Gillespie contrasts the act (portrayed as individualistic) and the social
act (the sole source of intersubjectivity). Such a dichotomy is totally strange
to Mead’s thinking. It conveys the (wrong) idea that Mead made a rigid
separation between the act and the social act, the former being a remnant of
Dewey’s influence and the latter his great contribution. On the contrary, for
Mead, the intersubjective nature of social life lies as much at the level of inter-
personal relations (the subject–subject relation mentioned by Gillespie), as it
does at the level of individual minds (the subject–object relation mistakenly
considered by Gillespie to be non-intersubjectivist). Mead’s chief contri-
bution to contemporary debates on intersubjectivism is not the social act as
Gillespie suggests (which is but a specific category of acts that involve the
cooperation of more than one individual), but a conception of action and
rationality that encompasses the whole range of human experience, from the
individual four-phased act to large-scale social interactions. Moreover, I
would like to emphasize that Mead’s starting point is not the individual act,
performed by a solitary rational being, but the social interaction through
which individual selves eventually emerge. Process, evolution and emergence
are the cornerstones of Mead’s intersubjectivist model: from the individual
act to complex social acts, the rationale of Mead’s analysis is, contrary to what
is suggested by Gillespie, exactly the same.
The problem with Gillespie’s line of thought is that it excludes ‘objects’
from his analysis. It is a purely subject–subject relation that Gillespie tries to
find in Mead. Mead, however, always rejected such a culturalist understand-
ing of mind and consciousness. My claim is that Mead’s chief contribution
for the overcoming of Descartes’ solipsistic model is a theory of the act
according to which social actors engage with the world of which they are
part and parcel, including other individuals and themselves, in such a way
that they are able to control their conduct. Among his brilliant insights lies
the idea that as the object controls the act, social objects control the social
act. Gillespie, like anyone whose analysis is primarily culturalist, fails to
grasp this important claim. At the root of Mead’s contribution to the over-
coming of the Cartesian paradigm is the insight that the act, with its four
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distinguishable phases, can be conceived only within a social act: the meaning
of the act of an individual, as Mead always emphasized, lies in a ‘threefold
relationship of gesture to adjustive response and to the resultant of the given
social act’ (Mead, 1997[1934]: 80). In other words, the meaning of an indi-
vidual action is found to be implicit in the structure of the social act. One
cannot thus claim that the only intersubjective element of Mead’s social
theory is the ‘social act’; the social act is itself composed of symbolically
mediated acts, whose intersubjective character should not be underestimated.
THE SECOND PILLAR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
My aim in the present section is to demonstrate the logical priority of the
pillar of science in relation to the pillar of social psychology. In other words,
I shall discuss the point of view from which Mead ‘attacks the problem of
consciousness’. I contend that Mead examines this problem through the lens
of a research scientist. The scientific attitude bears a strong resemblance to
the perspective of a ‘generalized other’. In turn, the latter standpoint is very
similar to the attitude of a moral agent able to make critical moral judge-
ments. In this section, I shall start by indicating the similarities between these
standpoints. As will be seen, all three perspectives share an orientation
towards abstraction, impersonality and objectivity. It is possible, as I shall
next seek to show, to find behind such a ‘convergence of perspectives’ two
fundamental elements of Mead’s system of thought: his conception of knowl-
edge and his model of action. Finally, this will bring me back to the guiding
theme of the section, Mead’s project of a ‘scientific social psychology’ (1994:
379) in the context of his conception of the relation between the natural and
social sciences. As in the other two pillars, my methodological strategy here
involves both a genetic and a thematic reconstruction of Mead’s ideas. When
applied to the case of social psychology, this strategy allows us to see that the
abstract and impersonal perspective associated with the ‘generalized other’ is
a concrete instance of how the three different problem-areas to which Mead
devoted his career all come together.
Mead introduces the notion of the ‘generalized other’ as an essential
condition for the full development of the human self.6 This concept refers to
a set of social attitudes that are internalized by the self. How does Mead
explain this process of internalization of social norms? Rejecting the
traditional Cartesian model of the self as a passive recipient of external social
rules (thus replicating, at the social-psychological level, the dichotomy
between a subjective inner world and an objective external reality), Mead
suggests a model according to which the self is an active interpreter of social
attitudes. The concept of the ‘generalized other’ helps Mead explain how,
during the game stage of the process of childhood development, children
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learn to monitor their conduct according to the perspective of everyone else.
While playing at games, children take the role not of a single individual other
(which they do while playing a specific character as in Mead’s famous
example of the ‘Indian’), but of each and every other team mate – such a set
of organized attitudes is the ‘generalized other’. Of course, the game stage is
but the prelude to social life. As children grow, Mead argues, they gradually
acquire the ability to import the attitudes of the social group into their own
selves. For Mead, the self takes part in social life not by playing pre-given
social roles, but by interpreting and reformulating in its mind the attitudes
that are common to the group.
How exactly does the attitude of the ‘generalized other’ relate to the social-
psychological mechanism of taking the role or attitude of the other? The best
answer to this question is found in an undated and posthumously published
paper, ‘Consciousness, Mind, the Self, and Scientific Objects’ (Mead, 1982).
To begin with, Mead argues, self-consciousness is attained when the self
acquires the ability to become an object to himself: ‘Mind is that part of
experience in which the individual becomes an object to himself in the
presentation of possible lines of conduct’ (Mead, 1982: 177). Associated with
this self-objectifying ability, Mead points to the presence of certain affinities
in the organisms of the individuals engaged in the social act – for instance,
the social stimulus that is the vocal gesture must be heard and understood in
a similar way by the individuals in question (see also Mead, 1925: 270). He
then calls our attention to the set of ‘common attitudes’ at the disposal of the
individuals: each and every one of us is able to take the attitude of everyone
else – social life can thus best be described as a ‘generalized environment’
inhabited by ‘generalized organisms’. Mead concludes:
The effect of taking the role of anyone is to eliminate the peculiarity of
the environment of any one individual and to substitute for any concrete
individual an abstraction – a generalized individual, the thinker. (Mead,
1982: 178)
In short, the ‘generalized other’ provides Mead with a social-psychological
explanation for (1) abstract thinking, (2) social control as rational self-
criticism, and (3) self-consciousness. As to abstract thinking, Mead identifies
it with communication with oneself when one speaks in the voice of the
community to which one belongs. When, for instance, we offer a price for a
car, we are taking all the roles from the producer to the sales manager. In so
doing, we may, for instance, say the car is too costly since we can put
ourselves in the various stages of its production, commercialization and
utilization. In this way we respond to the entire community – this response
thus acquires a universal character. In referring to the ability of exerting
rational self-criticism by role-taking the ‘generalized other’, Mead points to
the incorporation of social norms and expectations through the ‘me’. In this
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sense, social control is as much a source of social regulation of individual
behaviour as it is a source of individuality (see Mead, 1997[1934]: 255). Finally,
Mead’s intersubjective explanation of the emergence of self-consciousness is
closely related to our capacity of taking the attitude of the ‘generalized other’.
Social life requires that the individual takes up a variety of social roles and
common attitudes. When the individual addresses himself in the attitude of
the group, he becomes a generalized other. Since ‘the others and the self arise
in the social act together’, he becomes a ‘definite self over against the social
whole to which he belongs’ (Mead, 1926: 81, 80).
As this last passage indicates, the attitude of the ‘generalized other’ can be
discussed also from the vantage point of Mead’s theory of the act. As he
explains in ‘The Genesis of the Self and Social Control’ (1925), whereas vocal
gestures belong historically to the beginning of the act, having provided in
phylogenetic terms the medium of social organization in human society, the
‘generalized other’, which enables us to ‘attain to the levels of abstract
thinking, and that impersonality, that so-called objectivity that we cherish’
(1925: 272), is located in the later phase of manipulation. The ‘generalized
other’ is still connected to another phase of the act, namely the stage of
consummation. As Mead contends in ‘The Objective Reality of Perspectives’
(1926), the common perspective associated with the generalized other ‘exists
in the organisms of all the members of the community, because the physio-
logical differentiation of human forms belongs largely to the consummatory
phase of the act’ (Mead, 1926: 80).
As will be shown in the next section, the critical vantage point from which
one can criticize the existing moral order is precisely the standpoint of a
‘generalized other’. The example of a child in a room mapping the environ-
ment, crawling about, perceiving a given object at a distance, seeing it at
successive moments in time until she eventually grabs it, is what Mead has in
mind when he equates knowledge with the process of coordination of
perspectives (see 1938: 134). As one can see, the phase of the act in which the
coordination of perspectives is achieved is that of manipulation. Mead,
however, is very keen on rejecting the identification of the percept with the
object of knowledge. Rather, Mead identifies knowledge with the solution of
problems human beings face whenever they act, either in scientific research,
in social situations, or in moral and political contexts. From his model of
action, one can draw significant conclusions concerning which kind of
knowledge can be found in each of these contexts of action. In moral situ-
ations, cognition is correlated to the phase of consummation: the moral agent
knows the value of an object as a result of the practical interaction between
him or her and the object of perception. In social situations, the objectivity
attained augments insofar as cognition is related to perception from a
distance of secondary qualities (such as sounds). Such is the case of two indi-
viduals in dialogue with each other. The most objective knowledge, however,
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occurs in the context of scientific research. The interaction between subject
and object in this situation is based on the cognition of primary qualities
(such as mass) through the manipulation of objects (1938: 104).
I am now in a position to draw a parallel between the perspective of the
scientist and the standpoint of a ‘generalized other’. The textual basis that
will be summoned in support of this assertion is found in two of Mead’s
articles: ‘The Objective Reality of Perspectives’, published in The Philosophy
of the Present, and ‘Perception and the Spatiotemporal’, included in The Phil-
osophy of the Act. In the first essay, Mead discusses the conception of a set
of events as the organization of different perspectives of these events, from
the point of view of a scientific social psychology. The objective data of such
a scientific discipline consist in ‘those experiences of the individuals in which
they take the attitude of the community [i.e. the generalized other]’; by
making use of these data, the critical social scientist is ‘only replacing the
narrower social perspectives of other communities by that of a more highly
organized and hence more universal community’ (2002[1932]: 175). Seen in
this light, the experimental method is the technique by which the individual
perspective becomes the perspective of the most universal community, that
of the ‘logical universe of discourse’.
In the second essay, Mead provides us with a description of how scientists
apply this technique. As he explains, in the case of a fig-tree, it is only from
the point of view of the scientist that fig-trees reach their fruitage through the
action of the wasps. The two stories of the fig-tree (fertilization of the flower)
and of the wasps (digestion of the honey) intersect when seen from the stand-
point of the scientist who introduces wasps to fertilize fig-tree flowers. In a
sense, then, the scientific perspective ‘includes the perspectives of both’ the
fig-tree and the wasps (1938: 184). This ability of the scientist to reach a stand-
point which includes the perspectives of the various objects of knowledge is
but the systematic development of the human ability to assume the attitude
of the ‘generalized other’, as reconstructed by social psychology. What Mead
is suggesting, after all, is that one can draw a parallel between the scientist,
who takes a perspective able to unify an object of knowledge, and the attitude
of a ‘generalized other’, which allows the emergence of a unified self.
Mead’s conception of the relation between the natural and social sciences
helps one to understand the way in which social psychology is supposed to
be a scientific endeavour. In the social and natural sciences alike, given the
experimental and problem-solving nature of their activity (see, for example,
1906: 391), scientists are interested in particulars insofar as they emerge as
exceptions to universals. The solution of the problem brings with it the
disappearance of particular instances in the ‘universality of the law’ (1938:
634). In the case of the physical sciences, the scientist frees her or his percep-
tions from the idiosyncrasies and perspectives of particular observers through
the discovery of the ‘uniformities which hold for all observers and thinkers’
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(1938: 22). Similarly, in a scientific social psychology, the standpoint to be
adopted should be one that lies in the intersection of all differing perspec-
tives on the object so that it can disclose the self’s uniformities that can serve
as data for scientific experimentation, while at the same time retaining their
particular content. Psychical events become scientific data only when they
correspond to definite conditions of objective experience.
This attempt to reconcile the universal character of social psychology’s data
and the particular nature of the human mind is revealed when Mead discusses
the relation between the attitude of a ‘generalized other’ and social control. If
a science of the self presupposes such an abstract, impersonal and objective
perspective so that the typical features of the human self are identified, does
this mean that there is no space for individuality in Mead’s scientific social
psychology? Very much on the contrary, by identifying social control with
the self-critical attitude of the individual who adopts the attitude of a ‘gener-
alized other’, Mead argues, in his 1928 lectures on social psychology, that
social control is ‘actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that
individuality; for the individual is what he is, as a conscious and individual
personality, just in as far as he is a member of society’ (1997[1934]: 255).
THE THIRD PILLAR: COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS
AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Among the first written documents in which one can find stated Mead’s
favouring of a scientific approach to the solution of political problems is the
1900 article ‘Suggestions Towards a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines’.
In this important paper, Mead suggests that reflective thought can reconstruct
a problematic situation in two distinct ways. One can approach a moral
problem either by deductively reaffirming old meanings as they apply to the
problem in question, or by inductively searching for new meanings: for
instance, poverty can be conceived of either as a natural feature of human
societies or as a social problem requiring solution. Mead considers this latter
approach to be superior since it treats moral problems as occasions for moral
growth, and not as ‘chronic and destructive’ conflicts (1900: 15). Further-
more, such an inductive method of moral reconstruction bears a strong
resemblance to the experimental method used by the research scientist: the
moral agent has to do justice to all the relevant values in the problematic situ-
ation, just as the scientist has to take into account all the relevant facts in
order to produce a working hypothesis. Some years later, Mead restates this
idea in ‘The Philosophical Basis of Ethics’ (1908). In this article, however,
Mead no longer speaks of inductive and deductive moral methods, but of
‘abstract external valuation’ and ‘concrete valuation’ (1908: 322). Notwith-
standing this terminological modification, Mead’s favoured approach to
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morals continues to reject any appeal to a transcendent fixed moral order.
Mead identifies this latter approach with the attitude of the ‘pulpit’, suggest-
ing that one should assume instead the attitude of the ‘scientific investigator’
(1908: 321). Whereas abstract external valuations are made in reference to a
fixed model of previously existing conduct, concrete valuations have the
advantage of confronting the moral agent with a dialectic process of moral
reconstruction, very much in the spirit of experimental science. Comparing
an engineer’s task of constructing a railroad with a moral agent’s need to solve
a moral problem, Mead asserts that moral advance can be secured only if the
moral agent is able to experimentally evaluate and eventually abandon or
transform old moral values (1908: 320). Moral growth, like scientific growth,
is a creative intellectual process.
In the 1913 article ‘The Social Self’, Mead connects for the first time this
reflection on morals to his insights on social psychology. Such a connection is
made taking into consideration his conception of science as a problem-solving
procedure. Comparing this text with Mead’s previous writings, the major
difference lies in the ‘essentially social character of the ethical end’ (1913: 378)
and of the process by which moral problems are supposed to be resolved.
Returning to the example of poverty, the intelligent resolution of this problem
is equated with the good of the community as a whole. Mead now criticizes
as ‘selfishness’ what earlier he called ‘deductive’ and ‘external valuation’
methods of moral reconstruction. His favoured way of solving moral problems
and securing moral growth is still an approach that does justice to all the values
at stake. By resorting to reflective analysis, the moral problematic situation
can be reconstructed in such a way that new and enlarged selves may emerge.
What science teaches us, Mead claims, is that out of a moral problem a new
self can emerge, a self whose interests are much more in accordance with the
community’s interests than those of the old self. Problems involving conflict-
ing moral values should, then, be seen as instances of moral reconstruction
and growth. In this respect, the logic of moral and scientific reconstruction
is identical. There is, however, one fundamental difference between the
scientific and the moral solution of a problem. Whereas scientific problems
concern interests that do not affect the human self, moral problems deal with
‘concrete personal interests, in which the whole self is reconstructed in its
relation to the other selves whose relations are essential to its psychology’
(1913: 379). What ‘The Social Self’ introduces is a psychological treatment of
moral issues in the light of the method of intelligence. In this article, one can
see how each pillar contributes to the workings of Mead’s system of thinking:
science gives the method, social psychology the objective explanation of
human subjectivity, and morals and politics the objective solution for the
problems of the ‘moral or social order’ of modern industrial societies.
In the 1923 article ‘Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences’, Mead
develops what is arguably his best articulated account of a ‘psychology of
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ethics’. Mead’s starting assertion identifies the realm of morals with social life
since ‘morality has to do with the relations of intelligent beings with each
other’ and ‘this determined moral or social order is a world as it should be
and will’ (1923: 230). There is, though, a dichotomy between two attitudes
towards the social or moral order in which human beings develop their lives.
On the one hand, there is the religious or teleological attitude taken by those
for whom ethical ends are given in advance and who regulate their social and
moral conduct accordingly. On the other hand, there is the scientific or
mechanical attitude taken by those who distinguish a moral order that is
anticipated from a natural order that is known a posteriori (1923: 231–2). Mead
highlights the fact that humanity has been very successful in applying the
scientific method to the natural order while leaving the moral order out of
the field of scientific analysis. Among the most negative consequences of
this situation, Mead adduces the examples of the First World War, a conflict
triggered by the particularistic and narrow nature of the ends in dispute, and
of municipal politics, where policy-making hardly makes any use of scien-
tific knowledge. Mead’s position is unequivocal: ‘It would be a mistake to
assume that scientific method is applicable only in the fashioning and selec-
tion of means, and may not be used where the problem involves conflicting
social ends or values’ (1923: 235).
Such a categorical statement seems, in the light of contemporary moral
philosophy, difficult to sustain. Contrary to the faith in scientific progress
characteristic of most members of Mead’s generation, today’s reflection on
morals tries at best to attain logically plausible arguments, avoiding any
claims of being able to achieve law-like rules or maxims. There are, however,
contemporary attempts to construct scientific moral-philosophical theories,
even if this scientific character is carefully distinguished from the knowledge
produced by the natural sciences.7 I would nevertheless like to emphasize
that Mead’s scientific approach to moral and social problems itself embodies
an ethical ideal, an ideal of an impartial resolution of moral problems. Such
an impartiality is inspired by the attitude of the research scientist.
The ultimate goal of a science of politics and morals is the resolution of
concrete ethical problems. Exactly how this science is to be intertwined with
a scientific theory of the psyche was something Mead felt the need to explain
to his students in his lectures on social psychology. In fact, the social theor-
etical basis of Mead’s moral and political thought can be grasped in scattered
remarks throughout Mind, Self, and Society. In this book, Mead speaks of a
further attitude in which the social-psychological mechanism of ‘taking the
role of the other’ enables the individual to ‘enter into the attitudes of the group
and to mediate between them by making his own experience universal, so that
others can enter into this form of communication through him’ (1938: 257).
Mead is here referring to the statesman, whose ideal stance is as universal as
the community in which he lives. Democratic politics, ‘this great co-operative
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community process which is going on’ (1938: 188), depends on the level of
participation and communicative interaction between the citizens. The states-
man is able to conduct social reform only insofar as he is able to adopt the
attitude of the ‘generalized other’. And it is this capacity for taking the gener-
alized attitudes of their social group that provides politicians with a ‘universe
of discourse’ in terms of which they can address political problems in an
impartial manner (1938: 89–90). Just as a critical moral agent is able to make
use of abstract thought to formulate a hypothesis of an alternative moral order,
a statesman is able to resort to the method of intelligence to reconstruct social
and political problems intelligently. Critical moral and political reflection
depends on a standpoint from which the ‘social or moral order’ may be
judged. Such is the perspective of abstraction, impersonality and objectivity
that distinguishes science from other human activities.
Mead’s ethics is, then, a scientific attempt to reflect on the practical
procedure of solving moral problems, a procedure which lays emphasis on
the creativeness of the reconstructive aspect of this problem-solving task. A
moral agent is able to criticize his own cultural horizon as long as he is able
to appeal to an ‘ideal world that lays claim upon him’, an ideal world, however,
that ‘grows out of this world and its undeniable implications’ (Mead, 1930:
145).8 Mead’s definition of such an ideal world that ‘grows out of this world’
is unmistakably drawn from his understanding of science and social psychol-
ogy – ‘the individual shall take into account all the values which have been
abstracted from their customary settings by the conflict and fashion his
reconstruction in recognition of them all’ (Mead, 1930: 146). The radical
democratic implication of this moral philosophical argument is that scientific
knowledge should be disseminated throughout all social layers so that every
individual citizen can have access, by means of his or her intelligence, to the
results of science. The rational communicative basis of Mead’s democratic
ideal is clear. All social and political institutions should be permeable to the
communicative fluxes coming from an informed citizenry; the necessary and
sufficient condition for this to happen is the definition of the rational
procedure for attaining agreements through mutual understanding. Science
and democracy, sustained by universal education and intelligent social reform,
are, in a clear pragmatist fashion, the sources of inspiration for Mead’s
proposed solutions for the problems of modern industrial society.
Once again, I would like to stress the importance of the unpublished
manuscripts held at the Mead Papers Archive. First, Mead’s rejection of tech-
nocratic solutions for the problems of increasingly complex and differenti-
ated societies goes hand in hand with his faith in the capacities of an informed
public opinion. ‘Government by experts’, as Mead argues in an unpublished
paper on the labour movement during the First World War, is founded upon
a fundamental fallacy: ‘The fallacy is the old one that out of mere interest in
good government an autocratic power above can govern in the interest of all.
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On the contrary, the power, prestige, and wealth of the upper caste will inevi-
tably subordinate to themselves the good of the whole community’ (Mead,
1917–18: 12–13). Second, Mead’s understanding of citizenship, only treated
in passing in his published articles and posthumously published books, is the
theme of an important unpublished essay.9 Probably written during the First
World War, this essay shows how entangled Mead’s various interests are. For
Mead, citizenship is the political correlate of the social nature of the human
self. A communicative theory of society, if it wishes to study the political
realm, has to analyse the political implications of membership of a community.
Mead draws a parallel between the individual’s membership of a social group
and of a political community, with the purpose of emphasizing the structural
and unconscious nature of these allegiances. His point is that our institutions,
such as the family, the school, or the court of justice, change and evolve in
ways we are not conscious of, except when they are put into question. In
moments of conflict, Mead asserts, the fundamental social values embodied
in these institutions are brought to consciousness. In those moments, indi-
viduals have to resort to the method of science in order to reconstruct the
problematic situation. In his own words,
If we could attack the institution by way of continual reconstruction
we would have as real an opportunity of feeling its import as we have
of the value of meeting a friend when we reconstruct our program
giving up this, that or the other privilege to compass this opportunity.
We get hardly more immediate meaning out of the constant process of
the evolution of social institutions than we do out of the processes
of dialectical changes which take place in our mouths . . . as great laws
of speech. (n.d.: 10–11)
This last passage reveals Mead’s willingness to connect political and moral
theory to an analysis of the human language by means of a communicative
theory of society and of the human self. From this perspective, Mead’s politi-
cal endorsement of radical democratic political solutions of a deliberative
kind is of particular relevance. Of course, this is not to say that Mead actually
developed a complete account of a deliberative model of democracy. Rather,
what I wish to suggest is that his political writings comprise a number of
assumptions that escape the traditional dichotomy that separates liberal from
republican models of democracy.10 Though less articulated than Dewey’s,
Mead’s pragmatist political thought is, nonetheless, sustained by a concep-
tion of science and a theory of social psychology that is unparalleled among
his contemporaries. The dialogical and cognitivist nature of Mead’s system
of thinking is the key that unlocks the various doors of his intellectual edifice.
From a conception of science as a cooperative effort for the mobilization of
human intelligence in the resolution of research problems through the defi-
nition of a working hypothesis, to a social psychology which aims at exposing
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the social nature of human consciousness, and from this to a moral and politi-
cal theory that draws on these two pillars in order to study the ‘social and
moral order’ of modern industrial societies, the same regulatory ideal is
suggested – that of a rational exchange of arguments having in mind all the
relevant facts in order to reach an agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I introduced the architectonic metaphor of an intellectual
building sustained upon three pillars, each one related to the other two in a
systematic fashion, with the purpose of showing how misleading it can be to
take Mind, Self, and Society as Mead’s magnum opus. Very much to the
contrary, as I have tried to demonstrate, that particular set of lecture tran-
scripts provides access to only a fragment of Mead’s intellectual production.
Mead’s enterprise was an ambitious one, both in scope and complexity. From
a theory of human phylogenesis and ontogenesis to an analysis of language
as a medium of communication and social coordination, from his writings on
the history of science to his theory of the act and his philosophy of the
present, from his radical theory of democracy to his ethical theory oriented
to the resolution of moral problems, Mead’s oeuvre emerges, in the light of
my interpretation, as a classical account of American social and political
theory. I have also maintained that the relation between current practitioners
and the classic figures of their disciplines should be of a dialogical nature.
This is why I believe it necessary to reconstruct in a historically minded
fashion the past contributions of the social and human sciences if meaning-
ful dialogue is to take place. By offering an interpretation of his system of
thought based on the largest amount of textual evidence possible, my aim
was not so much to point to possible ways Mead’s system of thinking can
benefit theory construction in the present, as to provide a re-examination of
his social and political thinking that is, in itself, a theoretical resource for
contemporary social and political theorists. Contrary to the generality of the
commentators, who favour either chronological reconstructions of Mead’s
ideas or purely thematic ones, I have tried to show the advantages of recon-
ciling a historical reconstruction with a reconstruction based on topics. To
some extent, this goal is consonant with my aim of contributing to the dialog-
ical interplay between competing social and political theoretical proposals.
Mutual understanding between contemporary theoretical models can be
improved, even if only marginally, if the basis of our dialogue is not a set of
concepts reconstructed according to each theorist’s present needs, but a
conceptual apparatus reconstructed with the purpose of attaining historical
accuracy. Seen in this light, my central assertion that Mead’s system of
thinking exists in a state of flux seems to gain an increased significance.
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Take the psychological mechanism of ‘taking the role of the other’. This
crucial Meadian concept can be seen operating in the attitude of the research
scientist, in the attitude of the social actor (both from a phylogenetic and an
ontogenetic viewpoint), and in the attitude of the citizen. On the other
hand, there are different kinds of social environments within which the
human self develops its activities by meeting problems and adapting to
changing circumstances: the scientific community, the social group and the
political community. These pillars are linked in other aspects too. Given the
priority of the scientific pillar, the two others can be seen as scientific
approaches to specific problems, either the problem of the social origins of
the individual self, or the problem of the moral and political organization of
modern industrial societies. The relative importance of the second pillar is
reflected in a distinctively social-psychological approach that is mobilized to
analyse, for instance, the political phenomena. Finally, one can find a cate-
gorical conception of democracy in all layers of Mead’s writings. The notion
of an egalitarian, impartial, open to participation and discussion social order
pervades all aspects of his system of thought, from the inner forum of conver-
sation to international relations between nation-states.
The perspectives to which I am alluding reflect the eclectic character of
Mead’s thinking insofar as they are located in distinct problem-areas. The
relative autonomy of the perspectives of the research scientist, of the social
actor, and of the moral agent, however, should not mislead us. They are all
phases of Mead’s scientific enterprise, whose similarity demonstrates the
systematic nature of his thinking. One can perhaps speak of ‘convergence of
perspectives’: each pillar of Mead’s system of thought comprehends a certain
perspective that is structurally similar to the remaining two; they converge
in their common orientation towards abstraction, impersonality and objec-
tivity. Science’s practice of rational exchange of arguments between equals,
in which all facts must be taken into consideration and subjected to empiri-
cal testing, and in which every solution is inescapably provisional, is the
model upon which Mead draws to conceive of democracy. The cognitive and
linguistic nature of Mead’s conception of democratic politics provides
compelling evidence in support of this thesis. If ‘science and democracy’ is a
common theme amongst classical pragmatists, it is to Mead that we owe the
only communicative social theory that systematically connects science’s
problem-solving nature to democracy’s deliberative character by means of
social psychology that establishes the social nature of the human self. Such
is one of Mead’s seminal contributions to contemporary social and political
theory.
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NOTES
With sincere appreciation I thank Donald N. Levine, Mónica Brito Vieira, Patrick
Baert, Darin Weinberg, and William Outhwaite for thoughtful and challenging
comments on, or conversations about, earlier versions of this paper, as well as for
inspiration and support. I am also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their
criticisms and comments on this article.
1 For a critical analysis of the work of these Mead scholars, see Silva (2007), especi-
ally ch. 8.
2 For Mead’s criticism of Hegel, see, for example, Mead (1938: 505); for Mead’s
endorsement of Whitehead’s relativist ‘philosophy of organism’, see, for example,
Mead (1938: 280).
3 Mead describes perception as the ‘relation between a highly developed physio-
logical organism and an object, or an environment in which selection emphasizes
certain elements’ (1938: 8).
4 ‘Within the field of consummation all the adjectives of value obtain immediately.
There objects are possessed, are good, bad, and indifferent, beautiful or ugly, and
lovely or noxious’ (1938: 25).
5 As I have argued elsewhere, the intersubjectivism that allows Mead to supersede
Cartesian atomism without falling into the excesses of sociologism is founded
upon a conception of the act that is irreducibly dialogical (see Silva, 2007).
6 One of the best recent analyses of Mead’s concept of the ‘generalized other’ is
Dodds, Lawrence and Valsiner (1997).
7 One case in point is Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics, a programme of research
developed with Karl-Otto Apel since the mid-1970s.
8 Mead’s discussion of religious or intellectual geniuses, such as Jesus or Socrates,
in his 1928 lectures on advanced social psychology is based upon this very same
argument. See Mead (1997[1934]: 217).
9 I refer to Mead’s unpublished and undated paper ‘How Can a Sense of Citizen-
ship Be Secured?’
10 See, for example, Habermas (1996).
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